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The impact of the EU policies on its borderlands has been highly 
varied. We will argue that a valuable addendum on Rationalist ex-
plananda for such varied impact, can be found be exploring how 
the EU constructs its international identity vis-à-vis neighboring 
countries. We will use the Northern Dimension and the Union for 
the  Mediterranean  to  verify  how  the  EU  identitarian  projection 
creates contradictions and/or dissonance with neighboring coun-
tries to illustrate the uneven impact of EU policies. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
In the past decade the European Union (EU) has set about to elabo-
rate and periodically upgrade a set of fairly sophisticated and, some 
would  say,  innovative  framework  policies  for  some  of  its  non-
candidate neighboring countries. First of would be the 1995 Barce-
lona Process – now subsumed into the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM) – followed by the 1999 Northern Dimension.
1 These frame-
work policies have been hailed by many as pioneering inter-state re-
lations for different reasons. They have tried to put forth an ambi-
tious and comprehensive agenda for economic, political and socio-
cultural  development  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the  Baltic  Sea 
area, thereby going beyond traditional schemes of cooperation. The 
different financial assistance schemes linked (directly or indirectly) 
with these framework policies also allot fairly generous amounts for 
cooperation projects and on many points allows for greater donor-
recipient  coordination  compared  to  the  average  international  aid 
scheme. Finally, these framework policies have been perceived as 
litmus tests for the Union’s ability to “avoid drawing new dividing 
lines” in and around Europe (Council of the European Union 2002) 
by ways of creating inclusive multilateral frameworks encompass-
ing the EU and all its partners in each region. For these reasons 
some analysts have hailed the European Union’s approach toward 
its non-member neighbors as ‘postmodern’ (Smith M. 2003; Maull 
2006).  
 
Notwithstanding these innovative practices, it is surprising to ob-
serve that the EU has comparably had relatively scarce impact on 
the  socio-economic  development  in  neighboring  countries  in  this 
same time period. What is more, it is astonishing to note that the 
perception of the Union in several of these partner countries is not 
overly positive. Why is this? How come some of the EU’s neigh-
boring partners do not hold more good-will toward the Union in 
spite of the latter’s allegedly postmodern and pioneering ways?  
                                                 
1 The Union for the Mediterranean was introduced in 2008 as the unitary label on, 
in part, a new set of policies and, in part, existing ones, such as the Barcelona 
Process and facets of the European Neighborhood Policy. The paper will use 
the new name UfM throughout, although the paper mostly refers to the pre-
2008 policies.   European Political Economy Review  
   
26 
The present work will look at this paradox from the perspective of 
‘identity’. We will argue that the Union’s main problem has been 
the failure of its burgeoning foreign policy identity to resonate posi-
tively with its partners in these regions. We will therefore look at 
the specifics of how the EU constructs its international identity in 
relation with the countries in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea 
area and how this identity has played out, by ways of the UfM and 
the Northern Dimension. The two case studies have been chosen for 
being central to the EU’s foreign policy ambition to have greater 
say and sway over countries bordering its territory. These case stud-
ies also hold potential for revealing key insights into the EU inter-
national identity which might be compared with the EU foreign pol-
icy discourse and action in other areas of the world.
2 The first sec-
tion will outline some basic concepts and the profile of the EU’s 
identity construction in the Union’s discourse. The second section 
will look at how the EU’s identity has resonated with its southern 
Mediterranean partners. The third section will repeat the same exer-




2. The EU’s international identity: concepts and practice 
 
Identities  have  gained  importance  in  the  International  Relations 
academia  for  the  deeper  understandings  that  identity-related  re-
search may provide in terms of inter-state relations. Studies of iden-
tities  may,  for  example,  shed  additional  light  on  why  particular 
states facing global anarchy group together to create mutually rein-
forcing networks of collaboration (e.g. the EU). On other occasions, 
identities and identity constructions may unearth explananda for the 
dysfunctional relations between international actors which Rational-
ist explanations may overlook. A focus on identity as the principle 
research variable allows us, for example, to see that incompatible 
                                                 
2 These areas have consistently been tagged as of special interest to the EU even 
before the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. They were mentioned as of key 
importance in the EC’s priority list for CFSP Joint Actions in 1992 and their 
importance have since been confirmed by a recurrent set of policies, and for be-
ing among those regions receiving the lion share of the EU’s global financial 
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identity  constructions  can  generate  profound  tensions  and  under-
mine cooperative pursuits. 
 
Identity can be said to be constructed as a consequence of a two-
step process. First there is a formation of a ‘Self.’ Second, the Self 
is shaped in its relation to a set of specific and generic ‘Others’ in 
the social context in which the Self is inserted.  
 
The formation of the Self consists of processes whereby the actor 
assigns itself attributes and meanings. These designations contribute 
to the perception of the Self as individually distinctive and set the 
Self apart from others (Snow 2001). Collective identities are formed 
in similar processes. A sense of ‘we-ness’ is anchored in real or 
imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who com-
prise the collectivity. The feelings of a common bond, cause, threat, 
or fate that constitute the shared ‘sense of we’ motivate groups of 
actors to act together in the name of the collectivity, thus generating 
a sense of collective agency (ibid; Steinberg 1998). The collective 
agency is thus the tangible expression or output of the group iden-
tity in relation to non-group members.  
 
In the second part of the process, the collective Self is shaped in its 
contact with Others. Identities can, in this sense, be said to only 
truly acquire meaning when they come into contact with Others in-
side a determined social context.
3 Moreover, key to our argument 
here is the assumption that the ‘we-ness’ and its resulting collective 
agency can be said to be successful when Others accept and wel-
come  such  identity/agency.  If  on  the  contrary  outsiders’  balance 
sheet of that identity/agency is mostly negative, then this is a sign of 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that we hold here that an identity is situational and specific, i.e. 
the identity may vary considerably in relations with different sets of Others. In 
essence, it is the combination of self-attributions, rather than the specific iden-
tity genres themselves, which changes in different social contexts. This is to say 
that the Self might choose to highlight or hide a particular identity trait as ap-
propriate. For example, the Union may choose to dwell on its trade strength and 
competitiveness in the global economy in relations to China or the US (great 
powers and trade competitors), while in relations to a poor and underdeveloped 
country, e.g. Bolivia, the Union might rest importance from its commercial pre-
dominance and instead emphasize its credentials as a major donor of financial 
assistance.    European Political Economy Review  
   
28 
that  the  Self  is  not  adequately  constructed  for  its  social  context 
and/or has not been adequately molded to fit into the environment 
in which it is inserted.  
 
Finally, it is pertinent to point out that identities are essentially a 
seamless string of an indefinite number of more or less stable iden-
tity  self-attributions.  However,  we  have  here  chosen  to  highlight 
how two of the Union most frequently reiterated discursive genres 
of  its  identity  –  the  EU’s  founding  myth  and  its  organizational 
logics – underpin the Union’s collective agency both in the Mediter-
ranean and in the Baltic Sea. The EU’s collective agency in relation 
to neighboring partners in these two areas take the form of three 
specific  policy  objectives:  promotion  of  regional  multilateralism, 
pursuit of multi-sectoral cooperation and interventionism. 
 
2.1. Regional multilateralism 
 
Regional multilateralism is one of the determining features of the 
EU’s  collective  agency  in  its  relations  with  neighboring  partner 
countries.  The  Union’s  penchant  for  grouping  countries  into  re-
gional arrangements “is a striking and unusual feature of its foreign 
relations; no other international actor does this to the same extent” 
(Smith K. 2003: 70) and has, according to Whitman, become “the 
chief characteristic of the diplomacy of the Union today” Whitman 
(1998:  10).  The  Union’s  promotion  of  multilateral  policy  frame-
works is in part a reflection of the Western European integration 
experience since the end of the World War II. This foreign policy 
trait thus finds echo in the EU founding myth and the Union regu-
larly attributes most of its current achievements (e.g. peace, pros-
perity)  to  that  initial  impulse  of  regional  integration  within  the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the Euro-
pean Community (EC). The Union’s promotion of regional multi-
lateralism  is  also  in  part  informed  by  organizational  logics.  One 
might argue that there has been a will among EU members, but per-
haps above all the European Commission, to organize the world or-
der in an equitable manner, to neutralize the obvious pitfalls of ‘ex-
ternalization’ (cf. Schmitter 1969) and partner countries’ competing 
claims of special favors. The trend has therefore been for the EU to 
offer fairly standardized relations to a set of countries grouped into 
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the Union and its member states’ staunch – and rarely questioned – 
belief that “efforts on the part of (usually) neighboring countries to 
address issues of common interest” is to the benefit for all parties 
involved (European Commission 1995). Another attributed advan-
tage of the Union’s regional multilateralist approach is that, in the 
words of one analyst, it “helps alleviate the feeling of inferiority in 
size and number that single states increasingly perceive” in a glob-
alizing world (Regelsberger 1990: 14).  
 
2.2. Multi-sectoral policies 
 
A second prominent trait of the EU’s collective agency in neighbor-
ing partner countries is the recourse to multi-sectoral policies, span-
ning a broad range of political, economic and socio-cultural fields 
of  cooperation.
4 The  Union’s  promotion  of  multi-sectoral  frame-
work policies can be held as linked to the early days of the Euro-
pean integration, whereby the EU is looking “to apply the EC model 
of functional cooperation” (Bretherton, Vogler 1999: 161). In es-
sence,  the  European  own  integration  experience  since  the  early 
1950s point to that techno-bureaucratic (apolitical) management of 
transborder concerns foment “creative association in […] problem-
solving [which] provides a learning-situation in which participants 
are gradually weaned away from their […] nationalistic impulses 
toward a self-reinforcing ethos of cooperation” (Pentland 2003). An 
organizational logic also informs the EU’s collective agency in this 
regard. The UfM and Northern Dimension can be taken as unique 
ensembles of framework policies spanning different issue areas and 
competences among EU institutions. For the EU the use of frame-
work policies has been necessary to providing a single, coherent 
frame within to coordinate different EU instruments. The result has 
been to enable “a greater consistency between the various pillars of 
the EU’s external relations” and consequently “improved the EU’s 
profile as a collective actor” (Alecu de Flers, Regelsberger 2005: 
339; cf. Smith K. 2003). This stands in contrast to the EC’s relative 
inability during the Cold War to engage in a multi-sectoral manner 
for  its  institutional  disconnect  between  the  EC  economic  instru-
                                                 
4 We use the term ‘multi-sectoral’ here to denote ongoing cooperation in different 
sectors which are linked into a loose, global framework, but without necessarily 
implying any coordination among the sectors in question.   European Political Economy Review  
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ments  and  European  Political  Cooperation  (EPC)  objectives  (cf. 
Nuttall 1992, 1997). In sum, the Union’s broad multi-sectoral col-
lective agency means to pursue cooperation with and among neigh-
bors in an apolitical, positive-sum game, where all stands to have 
their  preferences  satisfied,  whether  neighboring  partners  (socio-




A third and final prominent feature of the EU’s foreign policy in re-
lation to neighboring countries is its propensity for interventionism. 
An interventionist foreign policy actor displays a decided will to 
supply political direction beyond its territorial confines. K. Smith 
(2003: 199) notes that the EU’s collective agency on this point has 
even reflected an EU “reconceptualization of the practice of state 
sovereignty” in its willingness to shape the international environ-
ment through various instruments or mechanisms and to limit the 
freedom of states to do whatever they wish domestically and exter-
nally. Maull (2006) sees the EU’s principle of interventionism as a 
trait of a cosmopolitan, postmodern actor. This characteristic of the 
EU foreign policy can be taken to have explicit roots in the Euro-
pean integration experience of ‘pooled sovereignty’ and of a supra-
national  institution  which  is  allowed  intrusive  monitoring  of  the 
domestic affairs of the participant members. The EU’s collective 
agency is thus clearly informed, in the words of former External Re-
lations Commissioner Chris Patten (2000), by the ambition “to re-
flect abroad what is best about our own [EU] model [... i.e.] the bal-
ance we seek to strike between national freedoms and common dis-
ciplines.” This collective agency is also in part informed by organi-
zational logics. Conditionality is the cognitive bridge which brings 
political  objectives  into  dialogue  with  the  Union’s  economic  in-
struments and technical and financial assistance. One could also in-
fer that this is part of the Union’s particular quest to become a more 
active (as opposed to reactive) and, above all, profiled foreign pol-
icy  actor.  For  this  reason,  EU  financial  assistance  and  bilateral 
agreements contain the inclusion of a human rights and democracy 
clause concluded between the EC and third countries since the early 
1990s. Moreover, other types of conditionality are regular features 
in all major communitarian instruments regulating external financial 
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Europe that existed during the Cold War has thus seemingly been 
replaced by outward- or “a projection oriented actor, with increas-
ing foreign policy responsibilities” (Charillon 2004: 252). To make 
its  interventionism  more  palatable  to  its  borderlands  it  has  used 
concepts such as ‘partnership’ and ‘co-ownership’. Bicchi (2006: 
288) has termed this ‘inclusiveness’ meaning that EU foreign pol-
icy-makers (in theory or in practice) permit a role in its policy mak-
ing for neighboring partners actors affected by the Union’s sover-
eignty-intrusive regional framework policy. By appearing to be in-
clusive and provide equal standing among partners, it is supposed to 
take the edge out of the controversy of interventionism. 
 
Having so described the EU’s discursive identity genres which un-
derpin the EU collective agency toward neighboring partner coun-
tries, the remainder of the paper will now turn to the matter of how 
the  EU’s  framework  policies  have  resonated  with  Mediterranean 
and Baltic Sea partners. 
 
 
3. The EU’s collective agency at work in the Mediterranean 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership came into being in November 
1995 and was thought to become an instrument to comprehensively 
settle many of the problems inherent in the Mediterranean basin and, 
at the same time, signal a higher European political commitment to 
this area. Hence, in a formula reminiscent of the Helsinki Process, 
the Barcelona Declaration divides the partnership into three chap-
ters – political and security; economic and financial; social, cultural 
and human affairs (Barbé 1996: 26). It was quite widely held that 
such a holistic multilateral political and economic integration would 
be  the  solution  to  how  to  integrate  the  southern  Mediterranean 
countries into the international economy, to provide some political 
anchorage, to deal with the majority of sources of instability in the 
region as well as to blur the suspicion and antagonism which had 
impeded a close relationship during the bipolar period. In addition, 
in 2004 the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy which 
provides for a ‘deepened’ cooperation in many sectors (economic 
integration, JHA issues, etc.) and in 2008 the Union for the Mediter-
ranean added onto these existing frameworks.  
   European Political Economy Review  
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Nevertheless,  the  problems  which  have  accrued  in  the  Euro-
Mediterranean relations since 1995 can be explained as a misfit be-
tween the EU’s collective agency and the receptivity of the outsid-
ers to EU’s self-styled foreign policy identity. The EU has plainly 
failed to resonate with non-candidate Mediterranean countries on 
various levels.  
 
First,  the  multilateralization  of  EU-southern  Mediterranean  rela-
tions has been a contested exercise. It is possible to argue that the 
‘Mediterranean’ as a region encompassing all its rim-states, would 
not exist lest the EU had taken the initiative to group this heteroge-
neous set of countries together after the Cold War. However, the 
Union’s Mediterranean partners have come to resent the multilateral 
dynamic due to that, instead of finding strength in numbers, many 
of  them  have  seen  their  individual  politico-economic  situations 
since  the  1990s  stall  or  weaken.  In  cases  where  their  economic 
situation  and  leverage  have  improved  since  the  1990s,  the 
evolutions are more often explained due to global conjunctures (e.g. 
raising energy prices, such as Algeria) or bilateral out-region rela-
tions (e.g. signing trade agreements with third countries, as Mo-
rocco and Jordan have with the US), than as a consequence of en-
gaging in regional cooperation with the EU. Similarly, at the politi-
cal level, the EU-driven regional multilateral arrangements have not 
helped to alleviate much the political marginalization of southern 
Mediterranean  countries.  The  institutional  frameworks  developed 
have not proven solid enough for those countries which had hoped 
for that the Barcelona Process become a means by which to gain 
some  leverage  over  neighboring  countries.  The  Arab  southern 
Mediterranean countries cautiously welcomed the 1995 Barcelona 
Process as an opportunity to sway Israeli policies or have a greater 
droit de regard over events in the Middle East. However, Israeli’s 
reluctance to engage multilaterally to any significant extent, and the 
EU’s concessions in this regard, have undermined the multilateral 
character of the cooperation.
5 In overall, the EU has been highly 
reticent about allowing the Middle East conflict-related issues being 
discussed  in  the  UfM  (and  earlier)  framework,  lest  bringing  the 
                                                 
5 Del Sarto (2003) has argued that Israel’s unsettled national identity has made it 
an unlikely partner in Mediterranean region-building even if the peace process 
was placed on a better footing. Johansson-Nogués: Is the EU’s Foreign Policy Identity an Obstacle?    33 
whole regional cooperation to a ground halt. It would thus seem that 
the EU’s firm conviction that “regional cooperation is beneficial for 
others” (Smith K. 2003: 70) has thus (at least) not (yet) fomented a 
solid  ground  for  multilateral  cooperation  among  Euro-
Mediterranean countries. Perhaps for this reason, Spencer (2000) 
has  sustained  that  the  vision  of  a  Mediterranean  region  “is  held 
more by European partners than by southern Mediterranean part-
ners.”  
 
In terms of multi-sectoral cooperation, southern Mediterranean con-
cerns  have  centered  on  a  lack  of,  what  Bicchi  (2006:  288)  has 
termed ‘institutional reflexivity’, i.e. the capacity of EU foreign pol-
icy makers “to critically analyze the EU’s policy and adapt it ac-
cording to the effects the policy is expected to have on the targeted 
area.” In the Mediterranean, the EU’s partners have expressed mis-
givings on the EU’s multi-sectoral approach due to that many of the 
proposed measures did not appeared to suit the neighboring part-
ners’ political, economic and culturally specific circumstances.  
 
In the political sphere, for example, the principal problem is that the 
comprehensive EU formula is perceived as discursively framed by 
the European Union in a biased manner which is closer to European 
security needs than the partners. While in theory European security 
and  partners’  socioeconomic  development  are  highly  compatible, 
the complaint of the Mediterranean partners has been that the EU-
provided socio-economic cooperation has seemed too instrumental-
ized to guarantee intra-EU security against terrorism, migration, etc. 
than  to  provide  genuine,  positive-sum  cooperation.  The  EU-
promoted economic development, environment, culture and educa-
tion in third countries appear more subordinated to the logics of 
European security and stability than to the actual needs of the part-
ner country. Habib Ben Yahia, Tunisia’s Foreign Minister, has sus-
tained for example that despite the launch of the Barcelona Process 
with its emphasis on economy and culture nothing has essentially 
changed since the end of the Cold War in that “the north’s [i.e. the 
European] interest in the southern shore has always been about se-
curity” (as cited in Gomez 2003: 26).
6 Southern Mediterranean per-
                                                 
6 The cultural basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was, for example, put 
there  to  foment  ‘confidence  building  mechanisms’  (i.e.  security  overtones).   European Political Economy Review  
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ceptions are thus that the efforts to build a European identity are in-
creasingly being linked to the issue of security whether “with the ul-
terior motive of creating a larger European regional security order” 
(Charillon 2004: 254) or fear that external insecurity could repre-
sent risk to the whole European project (Waever 1996: 123). Hence, 
this generates southern Mediterranean doubts about the genuineness 
of the Union’s wish to help in their struggle for transition and/or so-
cio-economic development. In contrast, most Arab southern Medi-
terranean citizens feel that the security matter is most urgent, i.e. to 
renew efforts to find a solution to the Middle East conflict. But this 
appears to receive no more than a lukewarm support from European 
capitals (Barbé, Johansson-Nogués 2008).  
 
In the economic sphere, the EU has promoted macro-economic sta-
bility, reliance on export and the gradual opening up of domestic 
markets by ways of joining global economic institutions. However, 
by doing that the Union is often accused of promoting a liberal for-
mula – only infrequently questioned in the West for its correctness 
– but which is perceived as unfit for or threatening in some coun-
tries outside the West. Moreover, outsiders take issue with that the 
EU seems to promote one specific formula of embedded neoliberal 
economic development and growth, while EU members are obvi-
ously allowed many different approaches to market management or 
state-society relations, such as the role of the state in sustaining so-
cial development (Nicolaïdis, Howse 2002: 774). For these reasons 
many southern Mediterranean partners have come to question if the 
EU formula is the correct developmental recipe for them. Succes-
sive Arab UN Development Program Reports (cf. Arab Human De-
velopment Report 2005) have, for this reason, advocated that Arabs 
should cherry-pick the best of the Western economic model while 
not renouncing on autochthonous developmental methods.
7 Finally, 
                                                                                                              
France and Spain wanted to use the cultural dialogue to diffuse a widespread 
anti-Western stance in the Maghrebi societies and the increasing tension be-
tween Arab identities and Western ones which had surfaced in and around the 
Gulf War. 
7 Such  as  for  example  the  linking  up  with  trans-European  transport  networks, 
maritime cooperation, energy interconnections and cooperation through the in-
formation society, while abstaining from other areas. The most extreme form of 
this  search  for  autochthonous  formulas  is  perhaps  Algeria.  Darbouche  and 
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perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the EU formula is that the 
embedded liberalist approach entails a bargained reduction of trade 
restrictions by ways of dealing with the influence of protectionist, 
rent-seeking interest groups, and more generally paying off the ‘los-
ers’ from trade liberalization (Nicolaïdis, Howse 2002: 776). How-
ever, EU financial assistance has, in many cases, been arriving late 
and in too small quantities to really off-set the sectoral conversions 
where they have been attempted.  
 
Finally, in the cultural sphere, the European-centered approaches 
have also been resented. The lack of enthusiasm for the European 
approach stems from its bluntness and lack of adaptation to South-
ern Mediterranean societal constructions and mental imaginary. The 
EU has had important difficulties in adapting its formulas in non-
EU  contexts.  Some  Arab  Mediterranean  observers,  for  example, 
find  the  notions  of  ‘civil  society’  or  ‘decentralized  cooperation’ 
problematic (Baroudi 2004). As directly transposed concepts onto 
the current Arab world these concepts have little meaningful reso-
nance. Indeed, their argument is that voluntary, non-profit associa-
tive networks are alien to many Arab societies, in which traditional 
structures of society such as the family and especially the religious 
institutions are the natural outlets of social organization (ibid; cf. 
Johansson-Nogués 2006). The EU’s associative formula, seen from 
such a perspective, becomes an artificial implant in, or even a threat 
for, the existing culture and models of society and hence rejected 
from the instinct of wishing to preserve the distinctive traits of these 
societies. Moreover, the reluctance of the European institutions to 
finance cooperative ventures involving religiously affiliated Muslim 
organizations, even moderate ones, together with certain diplomatic 
incidents (e.g. the 2006 ‘Cartoon Crisis’) have spurred a sentiment 
among Muslim Arabs that Europeans are disdainful of their religion 
and identity. Some civil society activists in the southern Mediterra-
nean  have,  for  this  reason,  resisted  their  European  homologues’ 
overtures for cooperation to a greater extent than what occurred in 
Central and Eastern Europe because of “a widespread suspicion that 
                                                                                                              
pretending to affect its political identity particularly given that its leaders be-
lieve that home-grown experience is worth more than any form of imported 
model regardless of the price to pay”, especially as it is buoyed by high energy 
prices.   European Political Economy Review  
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EU democracy and human rights promotion has a subtext in the 
Mediterranean  of  undermining  the  Islamic  identity  of  societies” 
(Gillespie 2004: 6).   
 
The last element which will be examined here is that of EU’s col-
lective agency taking the form of interventionism. The Barcelona 
Process, in particular, would raise hopes in Algeria, for example, 
that “the preoccupations of the south were finally taken into consid-
eration by the Europeans” and that the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship marked “the end of a relationship between the north and south 
of the Mediterranean based on dictated cooperation” (Darbouche, 
Gillespie 2006: 15). These sentiments were revived with the launch 
of the UfM and its joint Secretariat and co-Presidency. However, 
while the verdict on the UfM’s institutional innovations is still out, 
experience has so far rather revealed the EU’s reluctance to ‘share’ 
its sovereignty with others. Intra-EU organizational constraints may 
be one of the main culprits in this regards. The EU is such a cum-
bersome entity that its foreign policy cannot truly reflect outsiders’ 
input to a large extent. The Byzantine negotiations between Council 
and Commission are so complex and time-consuming that adding 
input from external partners could potentially make the process in-
terminable. The trend has rather been that the Commission has told 
partner countries: ‘this is the offer, take it or leave it’ (cf. Gomez 
2003) and basically insisting on the application of the EU’s own ex-
isting  departures  –  understood  as  the  only  conceivable  basis  for 
commonly agreed norms (Gomez 2003).  
 
In  sum,  the  EU’s  collective  agenda  –  multilateral  regionalism, 
multi-sectoral cooperation and interventionism – have had a hard 
time resonating with southern Mediterranean countries. The formu-
las employed by the EU have been perceived as serving European 
preferences and as too blunt and too ‘European’ for local circum-
stances and mindsets. Moreover, little on the EU’s offer has man-
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4.   The EU collective agency at work in the Baltic Sea  
 
The Northern Dimension was introduced as a concept on the EU 
agenda by Finland in 1997. The Finnish ambition behind the First 
Foreign Minister Meeting in Helsinki in 1999 had been to create a 
sort of Barcelona Process for the Baltic Sea, but this idea did not 
prosper. The much more modest Northern Dimension instead cen-
ters on seven issue areas, ranging from freedom, justice and security, 
economic cooperation to culture and health. Still, the Northern Di-
mension was portrayed as sufficiently broad and multi-dimensional 
both draw the Baltic Sea closer to European structures as well as to 
provide a clear political added value for dealing with the majority of 
sources of instability in the area.  
 
In  2006-07,  the  Northern  Dimension  Initiative  was  given  a  new 
procedural  footing  in  the  form  of  a  ‘Northern  Dimension  Policy 
Framework Document’ which is a permanent agreement, drawn up 
with the full participation of the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia. 
The Northern Dimension now grants all four parties the same rights 
of agenda-setting, supervision and decision-making, and the frame-
work policy can only be amended by consensus of the four partners. 
Although the Northern Dimension is now considered the ‘regional 
expression’ of the EU-Russian Four Common Spaces, the initiative 
does  not  dovetail  fully  with  the  four  spaces  and  thus  remain 
autonomous  in  at  least  two  sectors  (environment  and  health). 
Moreover,  the  Northern  Dimension  does  not  count  on  its  own 
budget-line, but obtains EU funds for its activities and from a num-
ber of sources. Iceland and Norway have not experienced greater 
problems in fitting into the Northern Dimension framework. Russia, 
in contrast, has had clear difficulties in responding positively to the 
EU’s collective agency in the Baltic Sea area at different levels. 
 
The multilateralization of Baltic Sea relations precedes the launch 
of the Northern Dimension and has its origins in the different Baltic 
Sea cooperation initiatives launched in the late 1980s to early 1990s. 
However, it is important to note that without the European Union’s   European Political Economy Review  
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involvement  and  support,  the  region  would  not  have  coalesced.
8 
Russia would at first welcome the multilateral cooperation in the 
area, seeing it as a regional stabilizing element for the domestic and 
foreign policy changes it was undergoing after the fall of the Soviet 
Union.
9 However, instead of finding strength in multilateral coop-
eration, the Russian Federation has increasingly found it debilitating. 
The other Baltic Sea states’ economies grew at spectacular rates 
from the mid-1990s until the global financial crisis set in, much as a 
consequence of the opening up of the region as a trading space. In 
contrast Russia’s economic recovery was during the same period 
uneven and economic growth would only set in when global energy 
prices soared between 2003 and 2008. Moreover, the 1999 Northern 
Dimension, as well as other EU-supported political initiatives in the 
area (e.g. the Council of the Baltic Sea States, CBSS), exposed Rus-
sia to the multilateral dynamics of coalition-building and negotia-
tion among partners, something which Russian officials were rela-
tive  newcomers  to  in  the  1990s.  The  Russian  expectation  of  the 
Northern Dimension had been to be able to decisively influence the 
terms of cooperation given its condition as the largest player. How-
ever, instead Russia has had to share the agenda-setting of the vari-
ous Northern Dimension Action Plans with the EU and its smaller 
Baltic Sea neighbors. The result of such dialogues has not always 
been according to Moscow’s preferences and Russia has for this 
reason felt more constrained than helped by the multilateral frame-
work. Moreover, on strongly held Russian preferences, such as for 
example the situation of the Russophone population in Estonia and 
Latvia, as well as the status of Kaliningrad, Moscow has not always 
felt the support it has been looking for from the EU and its Baltic 
Sea partners. The result, in the view of Russia, has thus been more a 
situation where the other Baltic Sea states have found regional mul-
tilateralism beneficial to alleviate their politico-economic inferiority 
of size and number vis-à-vis Russia, but regionality has proved to 
provide little added value for resolving the more deep-seated prob-
lems with northwest Russia. For this reason Russia has had a hard 
                                                 
8 The EU was a founding member of the various regional initiatives linked to 
northern Europe, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States or the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council. 
9 Russia would, for the same reason, itself propose the launch a host of smaller 
regional cooperation formats elsewhere in the fringes of the former Soviet space 
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time to concur with the Union’s firm belief that regional coopera-
tion is beneficial to all parties involved and no solid ground for re-
gional multilateralism involving has thus ensued. Perhaps for this 
reason, observers note that the vision of a dynamic Baltic Sea re-
gion is more a question of non-Russian cooperation in the region, a 
notion which lies behind the 2009 strategy to launch a Baltic Sea 
Initiative involving only EU-members (Pabriks, Bildt 2007). 
 
In terms of multi-sectoral cooperation, Moscow has set off alarm 
bells in regards to the EU’s lack of ‘institutional reflexivity’ (Bicchi 
2006: 288). The Union’s use of ‘roll-around model’ in interaction 
with  virtually  all  neighboring  partner  countries  (Flaesch-Mougin 
2001: 69) has been disturbing to Kremlin. Russia has, in particular, 
come to rebel against the Europeaness of the multi-sectoral formula 
alleging that the EU-promoted political objectives, economic devel-
opment and culture serves the Union’s interest more than Russia’s 
own.  
 
In the political sphere, the Northern Dimension tried to foment a 
pragmatic, technocratic sectoral cooperation among the countries of 
the Baltic Sea region. Nevertheless, the Union has still not been 
able to overcome inter-state friction in the region to put cooperation 
on a solid footing (Browning, Joenniemi 2004). Instead Baltic Sea 
partners  have  grown  increasingly  testy  in  their  relations  to  each 
other since 1999. Russian bilateral tension with Poland (whether 
over beef or missile defense), the Baltic States (borders, minorities 
and a Baltic foreign policy critical of Russia) or with Sweden (for 
Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt’s critical remarks in the aftermath 
of the August war) remain an obstacle. Such negative stereotyping 
has  slowed  ongoing  cooperation  in  the  area  and  undermined  the 
needed confidence-levels to embark on new collaborative pursuits. 
Arguably, while the EU’s effort of breaking down traditional nega-
tive Self–Other depictions between the Baltic Sea states is to be 
welcomed as such, what the Northern Dimension experience indi-
cates is how difficult functionalist distension is to achieve in prac-
tice. Thus, although the Northern Dimension is a staple on the EU’s 
agenda and likely to remain so for some time, some of the more 
profound  aspirations  pertaining  to  the  initiative  have  made  scant 
progress, and to some extent have perhaps even been sidelined alto-
gether.   European Political Economy Review  
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In the economic sphere, the EU has promoted in its relations with 
Russia through the Northern Dimension the same liberal formula as 
it has with Mediterranean partner countries. However, the profound 
disagreements between the EU and Russia in this regard have fro-
zen attempts at greater economic cooperation in the Baltic Sea area. 
On its part, a self-assertive Kremlin has defended its ‘right’ to eco-
nomic  specificity,  whereby  the  modernization  of  the  Russian 
northwest  is  increasingly  seen  as  necessarily  passing  through  a 
stage of increased state interventionism into the Russian economy. 
The Russian government currently does not link the economic de-
velopment with social prosperity (as the EU would), but rather with 
the  country’s  economic  greatness  and  global  power  ambitions. 
Moreover, Putin’s government has put the Russian ambition to join 
the World Trade Organization on hold, and has argued that “[t]he 
[Western] developed countries were dominating the institutions of 
world trade in an ‘inflexible’ manner, even as their own share of the 
global  wealth  is  diminishing.”  The  then  Russian  President,  now 
Prime Minister, has also alleged that the world needs a “new archi-
tecture of international economic relations based on trust and mutu-
ally beneficial integration,” which Putin envisions to be based on 
regional economic areas – rather than on global institutions – cen-
tered on emerging market economies like Russia, China, India and 
Brazil  (International  Herald  Tribune  2007).  Whatever  the  merits 
and feasibility of such proposals, the statement starkly reflects the 
Russian unease with the EU approach.  
 
In the cultural sphere, it can be argued that the launch of the North-
ern Dimension per se has not made much of a notable impact on 
these pre-existing patterns of cultural referents and identity markers 
in the Baltic Sea region. In terms of Russia the Union’s collective 
agency is tempered by the noticeable pride over the Russia’s heri-
tage. This Russian sentiment is perhaps further stimulated by the 
nationalistic discourses which have emanated from Kremlin in re-
cent  years  with  aspirations  to  recover  the  historical  greatness  of 
their nation. This could perhaps explain the noticeable irritation in 
Russia when faced with discourses of the EU, or one of its member 
states, where the Union sets itself up as a model for Russia to be 
emulated  (Emerson  et al.  2005).  As  Wennersten  (1999:  280;  cf 
Neumann 1999) has noted, in such a narrative Russia is seen as the 
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them. Adding to the Russian exasperation is the fact that certain EU 
discourses seem to entail that the European Union equals ‘Europe’, 
i.e. that the EU somehow has a monopoly on deciding who is Euro-
pean and who is not and has assumed the political direction of the 
European  continent.  The  EU  appears  to  imply  that  Europeaness, 
alongside notions of geographical and cultural affinities, requires 
the fulfillment of certain political and socio-economic conditions as 
well. Wennersten (1999: 280-1) notes that “[t]urning its back on 
communism and embracing capitalism has not automatically made 
Russia either Western or European”, for want of fulfilling requisites 
in terms of the implementation in full of market economy and de-
mocratic principles, as well as human rights being honored in prac-
tice as well as in principle. The implications of it all is that the EU 
seems to consider itself at a higher state of social evolution from 
where it looks down on Russia, much to the latter’s dismay. Such 
polarized identity constructions hence impede close cooperation on 
many cultural (and other) fronts. 
 
The  final  aspect  to  be  considered  is  interventionism.  Most  EU 
neighboring partners are essentially opponents of any evolution of 
international society which involves a dilution of the concepts of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination. Russia, in 
contrast, favors the principle of interventionism. However, there is a 
crucial difference with what the EU stands for in this regard. If the 
Union sees its collective agency on interventionism as universal and 
as  legitimized  by  the  international  order  and  the  UN,  Russia 
strongly advocates the idea that interventionism should be a matter 
left to coalitions of regional players. Along this vein, Russia would 
be at the apex of the regional order deciding what type and under 
what  circumstances  interventionism  should  be  applied.  This  was 
one of the strongest rationales for Russian advocacy for revamping 
the Northern Dimension in 2006. Henceforth, the Union’s insistence 
on political standards derived from alleged universal values (e.g. 
health or environmental norms) can in other words only be legiti-
mate in Moscow after having been object of negotiations in the Bal-
tic Sea area or in bilateral EU-Russia relations. Russia has, in other 
words, no understanding for the dynamics of the EU’s “this is the 
offer, take it or leave it” and wants to be in full control over the de-
velopments within the Northern Dimension. Nevertheless, it is also 
worth noting that, on the whole, Russia would like the Northern   European Political Economy Review  
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Dimension to stop trying to ‘pool sovereignty’ on normative matters 
altogether. The Russian government has therefore set in a diplo-
matic offensive “to reduce the issue of values in the framework of 
negotiations with Europe. It is about avoiding that these moral and 
political concerns take up the majority of [EU-Russian] discussions, 
to the detriment of the mass of economic and commercial interests, 
mutually bearing substantial benefits” (Vinatier 2006: 12; Nikitin 
2006). Russia would, in other words, like the Union to abstain from 
its insistence on values and norms given that such conditionality are 
seen in Kremlin as “being overly intrusive and basically demanding 
Moscow’s full capitulation in the face of Europe” (Haukkala 2005). 
 
It can therefore be argued that the EU’s collective agency – regional 
multilateralism,  multi-sectoral  cooperation  and  interventionism  – 
has  failed  to  resonate  positively  with  Russia.  The  EU’s  offer  of 
leadership, as well as imposition of standardized, multilateral rela-
tions, has not been welcome in Moscow. Moreover, to Russia, many 
of Russia’s most urgent concerns with its northwestern oblasts have 




5.   Conclusion 
 
The EU’s foreign policy identity in relations to neighboring coun-
tries is constructed on a set of positive self-attributions – stemming 
from the EU’s own integration experiences and organizational logic 
– of what the Union and its member states can contribute to in in-
ternational relations. However, the argument here is that the EU has 
failed to resonate with its neighboring partners as a consequence of 
a lack of successful adaptation/modification of Self to fit the social 
context.  The  EU’s  international  identity  stems,  in  other  words, 
largely from a self-styled identity construction which inserts itself 
in the two regional contexts discussed here with little reference to, 
or social communication with, the preferences and identities of its 
partners. This raises the specter for that the EU’s foreign policy 
identity in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea stem more from the 
EU and its member states’ enthusiasm for the abstract idea of a 
common European foreign policy than providing a solid base for 
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tion of why the Union does not enjoy more good-will from these 
countries in spite of its allegedly innovative, postmodern ways. This 
also explains why the EU’s international identity has become an ob-
stacle for cooperation with these neighboring countries.  
 
Neighboring partners’ grievances on the EU’s collective agency in 
the  past  decade  can  be  summed  up  as  being  too  utilitarian,  too 
European and too intrusive. The regional multilateralism is resented 
for its failure to look after the best interest and preferences of the 
individual, rather than assuming that the utilitarian group-logic is at 
all times superior. The lack of individualized attention has meant 
that many partner countries have not experienced the much needed 
improvement in their political or economic situation in a globalizing 
world.  The  multi-sectoral  approaches  appear  to  EU’s  partners  as 
more about looking after European interests, especially security and 
trade protection, and favor European cultural practices, rather than a 
positive-sum game for all. Finally, the EU’s penchant for interven-
tionism into the internal affairs of a neighboring state is a sensitive 
matter for partner governments for how it limits on a state’s free-
dom to act and for its implications on the sitting regime’s legiti-
macy in the eyes of its citizens.  
 
The EU’s collective action is thus controversial with neighboring 
partner countries. The pertinent question then becomes: are there 
then any short term hopes that the EU may reform its collective 
agency and better adapt its identity to neighboring Others and con-
sequently ease the obstacles for today’s cooperation? The institu-
tional innovations inherent in the UfM and in the Northern Dimen-
sion Framework Document point to attempts to modify the Union’s 
way, in particular in reference to allowing the neighboring partners 
a greater say over agenda and evolution of the framework policies. 
However, there are also underlying structural factors which might 
make  this  more  egalitarian  partnership  propositions  tenuous.  The 
EU will still have to concert its views internally, lest the notion of a 
European foreign policy is completely abandoned, and hence the 
‘take-it-or-leave-it’ dynamics of the past decade is going to be diffi-
cult to overcome. Moreover, in terms of the EU’s promotion of re-
gionalism and its conditionality whether in terms of democracy and 
human rights or insisting on environmental standards have become 
such pillars of the EU’s international identity that compromising   European Political Economy Review  
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much on these principles might unravel the whole concept of the 
European collective agency and an EU foreign policy. The EU will, 
for  these  reasons,  probably  continue  to  experience  difficulties  in 
making true headway in cooperative relations with non-candidate 






The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of two 
anonymous  EPER  reviewers  and  the  financial  support  from  the 
Programa Nacional de Movilidad de Recursos Humanos de Investi-
gación, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Spain. Johansson-Nogués: Is the EU’s Foreign Policy Identity an Obstacle?    45 
References 
 
ALECU DE FLERS Nicole, REGELSBERGER Elfriede (2005), “The EU and 
Inter-regional Cooperation” in: HILL Christopher, SMITH Michael (eds.), Inter-
national relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 
317-42. 
 
ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004 (2005), Washington, United 
Nations Development Program, April. 
 
BARBÉ Esther (1996), “The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process”, 
Mediterranean Politics, 1 (1), pp. 25-42. 
 
BARBÉ Esther, JOHANSSON-NOGUÉS Elisabeth (2008), “The EU as a modest 
‘force for good’: The European Neighbourhood Policy,” International Affairs, 84 
(1), January, pp. 81-96. 
 
BAROUDI Sami E. (2004), “The 2002 Arab Human Development Report: Impli-
cations for Democracy,” Middle East Policy, XI (1), Spring, pp. 132-41. 
 
BICCHI Federica (2006), “‘Our size fits all:’ normative power Europe and the 
Mediterranean”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2), March, pp. 286–303. 
 
BRETHERTON  Charlotte,  VOGLER  John  (1999),  The European Union as a 
Global Actor, London, Routledge. 
 
BROWNING Christopher S., JOENNIEMI Pertti (2004), “Regionality Beyond 
Security?: The Baltic Sea Region after Enlargement”, Cooperation and Conflict, 
39 (3), pp. 233–253. 
 
CHARILLON  Frédéric  (2004),  “Sovereignty  and  Intervention.  EU’s  Interven-
tionism  in  its  Near  Abroad”,  in:  CARLSNAES  Walter,  SJURSEN  Helene, 
WHITE Brian (eds.), Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London, Sage, pp. 
252-64. 
 
COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION  (2002),  “Copenhagen  European 
Council Presidency Conclusions,” 15917/02, 12-13 December. 
 
DARBOUCHE Hakim, GILLESPIE Richard (2006), “Constructing a Mediterra-
nean Region — North African Responses,” Conference paper delivered to the 
31st BISA Conference, Cork, 18-20 December. 
 
DEL SARTO Raffaella (2003), “Israel’s contested identity and the Mediterra-
nean”, Mediterranean Politics, 8 (1), pp. 113–26. 
   European Political Economy Review  
   
46 
EMERSON et al. (2005), “The reluctance debutant: the European Union as Pro-
moter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood”, CEPS Working Paper 223, Brussels, 
Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1995), “Communication on European Community 
support or regional economic integration efforts among developing countries”, 
COM (95) 219, 16 June. 
 
FLAESCH-MOUGIN Catherine (2001), “Differentiation and Association within 
the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Area” in: MARESCEAU Marc, LANNON Erwan 
(eds.),  The  EU’s  Enlargement  and  Mediterranean  Strategy:  A  Comparative 
Analysis, Houndmills / Basingstoke, Palgrave, pp. 63-96. 
 
GILLESPIE  Richard  (2004),  “A  Political  Agenda  for  Regional-Building?  The 
EMP and Democracy Promotion in North Africa,” Institute of European Studies 
papers 040530. 
 
GOMEZ Ricardo (2003), Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Stra-
tegic Action in EU Foreign Policy?, London, Ashgate. 
 
HAUKKALA Hiski (2005), “The Relevance of Norms and Values in the EU´s 
Russia Policy,” UPI Working Paper 52, Helsinki, Finnish Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs.  
 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (2007), “Putin wants new economic 
‘architecture’”, 10 June. 
 
JOHANSSON-NOGUÉS Elisabeth (2006), “Civil Society in Euro-Mediterranean 
relations: What success of EU’s normative promotion?”, RSCAS Working Paper 
2006/40, Florence, Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies. 
 
MAULL Hanns W. (2006), “The Perils of NOT Conceiving EU Foreign Policy as 
a Civilizing Project”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 1, Bonn, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung. 
 
NEUMANN Iver B. (1999), Uses of the Other: The ‘East’ in European Identity 
Formation, Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
 
NICOLAIDIS Kalypso, HOWSE Robert (2002), “This is my EUtopia …: Narra-
tive as Power”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4), pp. 767-92. 
 
NIKITIN Alexander (2006), “Russian Perceptions and Approaches to Coopera-
tion  in  ESDP,”  EUISS  Analyses,  available  from 
www.isseu.org/new/analysis/analy145.pdf.  
 Johansson-Nogués: Is the EU’s Foreign Policy Identity an Obstacle?    47 
NUTTALL Simon (1992), European Political Co-operation, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press. 
 
NUTTALL  Simon  (1997),  “Two  Decades  of  EPC  Performance,”  in: 
REGELSBERGER Elfriede, DE SCHOUTHEETE DE TERVARENT Philippe, 
WESSELS Wolfgang (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC 
to CFSP and Beyond, London, Lynne Rienner, pp. 19-40. 
 
PABRIKS Artis, BILDT Carl (2007), “The Baltic Sea Region – the Most Dy-
namic  in  the  World”,  2  July,  2007.  Available  at 
http://www.am.gov.lv/en/news/DomesticNews/2007/july/02-1/ 
 
PATTEN  Chris  (2000),  “A  European  Foreign  Policy:  Ambition  and  Reality,” 
Speech at Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris, 15 June. 
 
PENTLAND Charles (2003), “The EU and Southeastern Europe After Dayton: A 
Canadian  Perspective”,  Conference  Paper  delivered  at  Southeastern  Europe, 
Moving  Forward  Conference,  Ottawa,  January  23-24.  Available  at 
http://www.carleton.ca/ces/papers/january03/pentland03.pdf .  
 
REGELSBERGER Elfriede (1990), “The dialogue of the EC/Twelve with other 
regional  groups:  a  new  European  identity  in  the  international  system”,  in: 
REGELSBERGER  Elfriede,  EDWARDS  Geoffrey  (eds.),  Europe’s  Global 
Links: The European Community an Inter-Regional Cooperation, London, Pinter, 
pp. 3-26. 
 
SCHMITTER Philippe (1969), “Three Neofunctional Hypotheses about Interna-
tional Integration”, International Organization, 23 (1), Winter, pp. 161-166. 
 
SMITH Karen E. (2003), European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 
London, Blackwell. 
 
SMITH Michael (2003), “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: 
Towards a Postmodern Policy Framework?”, Journal of European Public Policy 
10 (4), August, pp. 556-75. 
 
SNOW David (2001), “Identity in European Security Map, Collective Identity 
and Expressive Forms”, Paper 01-07, Center for the Study of Democracy (Uni-
versity of California, Irvine). 
 
SPENCER Claire (2001), “The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case 
of the Mediterranean”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 6 (1), pp. 31-51. 
 
STEINBERG Marc W. (1998), “Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective 
Action Framing from a Discursive Turn”, Theory and Society, 27 (6), pp. 845-
872.  
   European Political Economy Review  
   
48 
VINATIER Laurent (2006), “EU-Russian Relations: Moscow lays down its Con-
ditions”, Notre Europe Policy Paper 20. 
 
WENNERSTEN Peter (1999), “The Politics of Inclusion: the Case of the Baltic 
States”, Cooperation and Conflict, 34 (3), pp. 272-96. 
 
WHITMAN Richard G. (1998), From Civilian Power to Superpower? The Inter-
national Identity of the European Union, Houndmills, Macmillan Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 